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The Limits of Material Benefits:  
Remittances and Pro-Americanism in 
Mexico 
Covadonga Meseguer, Pascal Jaupart, and Javier Aparicio 
Abstract: We explore how the reception of remittances affects percep-
tions of the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States. 
Scholars have claimed that the economic benefits of the relationship 
with the US prevail over imperialistic concerns as a result of the asym-
metry of power between the two countries. Empirical research shows 
that Latin American public opinion is indeed more supportive of the US 
than theory indicates. However, we identify two gaps in this literature. 
First, scholars have explored the determinants of generic expressions of 
sentiment toward the US, overlooking more concrete instances of coop-
eration between the two countries. Second, scholars have focused on 
trade and investment and have ignored how the material gains of emigra-
tion shape attitudes toward the US. The present paper fills these two 
gaps by using novel survey data on the bilateral relationship between 
Mexico and the US. On one hand, we find that while the reception of 
remittances correlates positively with good sentiments toward the US, 
the recipients of remittances are consistently more opposed to coopera-
tion with the US in the fight against drug trafficking. We argue that this 
finding can be explained by the different nature of the migratory phe-
nomenon, and the connection between anti-drug trafficking policies and 
the close scrutiny of illegal flows of money and people.  
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Introduction 
In this paper, we explore how the reception of remittances shapes the 
views of Mexicans regarding the bilateral relationship between Mexico 
and the United States.1 Recent research on the determinants of attitudes 
toward the US in Latin America has emphasized the relevance of materi-
al interests in shaping those attitudes. Indeed, against the extended view 
that Latin Americans’ attitudes toward the “colossus of the North” are 
primarily negative due to decades of intervention in the internal matters 
of these countries (Rubinstein and Smith 1988; Smith 2000; Morris 2005; 
Sweig 2006), some authors have shown that material exchanges, in-
creased contact, and greater economic integration can counter those 
feelings of resentment and translate into more positive views of the 
United States (Radu 2004; Morris 2005; Baker and Cupery 2013). In 
particular, empirical research has shown that contact with the US in the 
form of travel or relatives living abroad has a strong leverage in terms of 
leading Latin Americans to hold more positive views of the US (Morris 
2005; Martínez and Lago 2008; Azpuru and Boniface 2015). By the same 
token, economic exchanges, particularly access to more consumption 
goods through international trade, are strong predictors of positive atti-
tudes toward the US (Baker and Cupery 2013). 
We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we provide a 
closer look at migration as a form of economic exchange, especially to 
worker remittances – money transfers from migrants to their families left 
behind – as one of the factors that potentially shapes the attitudes of 
Mexicans toward the US. Second, we claim that the empirical literature 
on anti-Americanism should move beyond the exploration of generic 
perceptions and opinions of the US to address whether those senti-
ments, either positive or negative, translate into distinctive attitudes con-
cerning concrete instances of cooperation. After all, while it is interesting 
to know whether economic exchanges make respondents south of the 
border more sympathetic to the US, a much more interesting question is 
whether migrants and migrants’ families support greater bilateral cooper-
ation.  
In this context, how the reception of remittances may shape atti-
tudes toward the US remains largely unexplored. In line with the litera-
ture that suggests that consumerism in the south drives these positive 
                                                 
1  We appreciate comments by Maria Koinova, Sandra Ley, Gerardo Maldonado, 
Gerasimos Tsouparas, participants in the Workshop “Unpacking the Sending 
State”, Atlanta, 15 March 2016, and two anonymous reviewers. We acknowledge 
the support of a Newton/British Academy Mobility Fund in this research. 
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attitudes (Baker 2010; Baker and Cupery 2013), and taking into account 
the fact that remittances are overwhelmingly devoted to consumption 
(Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996), the reception of remittances is a 
variable that should strongly predict positive attitudes toward the US. 
This is indeed the case.  
However, we show that generic sentiments and attitudes regarding 
support for cooperation do not necessarily go hand in hand. Concretely, 
we study whether the reception of remittances makes recipients more 
supportive of greater collaboration with the US on the so-called “War on 
Drugs.” Using two waves (2010/2012) of the “Mexico and the World” 
survey, we compare generic attitudes toward the US (trust in, admiration 
for) versus attitudes toward US involvement in the combat of drug-
related violence. In particular, respondents were asked three specific 
questions: whether they would support financial support by the US to 
curb drug trafficking; whether they would support that assistance if it 
entailed supervision of the financial support by the US; and whether they 
would support that assistance if it entailed the presence of US troops in 
the country.  
Our results show that there are clear limits to the material gains hy-
pothesis. Remittance recipients are more likely than non-remittance 
recipients to hold positive views of the US and also to support US finan-
cial involvement in the fight against drug-related crime; however, recipi-
ents are not more likely than non-remittance recipients to support US 
supervision of those resources. They are less likely to support US finan-
cial involvement if it is conditional on the presence of US troops. Thus, 
support for greater cooperation with the US on this thorny but crucial 
foreign policy issue is partial and conditional on the level of intrusiveness 
of US presence. We argue that this greater opposition on the part of 
remittance recipients is related to specific aspects of anti-drug policies 
focused on fighting illegal flows of people and money, aspects that do 
not show in other types of economic exchanges, such as international 
trade or foreign direct investment.  
This paper contributes to an expanding research agenda that looks 
at changing incentives on the part of out-migration governments to 
reach out to the diasporas to secure the inflow of remittances (Aparicio 
and Meseguer 2012; Gamlen 2006; Iskander 2010; Leblang 2015), as well 
as a dynamic agenda exploring the consequences of remittances on elec-
toral and non-electoral political behavior, changing political attitudes, 
corruption, political accountability, and clientelism in out-migration 
countries or communities (Pfutze 2012, 2014; Pérez-Armendáriz and 
Crow 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz 2014; Córdova and Hiskey 2015). To 
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date, there has been virtually no research into whether and how out-
migration connects with foreign policy preferences from a bottom-up 
rather than a top-down perspective (see Careja and Emmenegger 2012 
for an exception). Consequently, we have only anecdotal knowledge of 
what kind of foreign policies emigrants and their families back home 
support. We seek to disentangle those preferences here.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we 
review the literature on the determinants of attitudes toward the US, 
with an emphasis on how economic and informational exchanges shape 
them. In Section 2, we look into the “War on Drugs” policies deployed 
by the US and their implications for migrants and remittance recipients. 
From these two sections, we derive two hypotheses that we test statisti-
cally in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes with a discussion and re-
assessment of the main policy implications of this study. 
1 Sources of Anti-Americanism  
Anti-Americanism is defined as “any hostile action or expression that 
becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign 
policy, society, culture, and values of the United States” (Rubinstein and 
Smith 1988: 36).2 A prominent attempt to scrutinize the sources of anti-
Americanism is Katzenstein and Keohane’s (2007a, 2007b) study, which 
identified six different origins of anti-American sentiment: liberal, social, 
sovereign-nationalist, radical, elitist, and legacy anti-Americanism. Of 
these variations, sovereign-nationalist, legacy, and elitist sources of anti-
Americanism are frequently referred to as the main determinants of 
hostility towards the United States in Latin America. By sovereign-
nationalist anti-Americanism, Katzenstein and Keohane mean the wide-
spread perception that the US has often abused its power, meddling with 
internal affairs from domestic politics to domestic economic develop-
ment. Indeed, over the past two centuries, the United States has:  
annexed territory, colonized and occupied independent states, 
embargoed trade, invaded to collect debts, staged coups, removed 
democratic leaders, backed brutal despots, expropriated land, 
dominated trade and investment relations, and sponsored violent 
insurgencies in Latin America. (Baker and Cupery 2013: 108)  
Legacy anti-Americanism stems from a perception of past wrongdoings 
committed against a society. Finally, elitist sources of anti-Americanism 
                                                 
2  See Chiozza (2009: 34–35) for a more detailed discussion of this definition. 
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refer to the embracing of this type of position among elites, quite often 
with instrumental purposes (Rubinstein and Smith 1988: 41). In recent 
years, a new wave of radical leftist leaders in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ec-
uador, and Bolivia have adopted an anti-imperialist discourse that some 
analysts interpret as a convenient tool to exonerate themselves from 
blame over domestic economic and political failures (Azpuru and Boni-
face 2015: 121–122).  
All too often, scholars of anti-Americanism assume that the adver-
sarial position adopted by some Latin American elites is shared by the 
ordinary citizen. As Rubinstein and Smith (1988: 36) put it, in Latin 
America anti-Americanism is a “venerable intellectual tradition.” Conse-
quently, most of what we know about attitudes toward the US in the 
region is taken from the discourse of political elites and intellectuals and 
based on what scholars often perceive to be the sentiment of the average 
Latin American citizen (Radu 2004; Sweig 2006). However, our knowledge 
of what mass public opinion toward the US is remains rather anecdotal. 
In the present article, we follow Giacomo Chiozza in defining “the study 
of anti-Americanism as the analysis of popular sentiment towards the 
United States,” where “popular” indicates the feelings reported by ordi-
nary citizens rather than those of cultural elites. We use “sentiment” the 
same way as Chiozza does, namely as “a mood that ordinary people 
entertain about the United States” (Chiozza 2009: 36). We also differen-
tiate between these sentiments and specific attitudes toward American 
foreign policy, using bilateral collaboration on the war on drugs as a 
concrete example.  
Instead of engaging in an in-depth review of the concept and causes 
of anti-Americanism, we concentrate on discussing two oft-cited deter-
minants of this sentiment that directly connect with our goal of explor-
ing the relationship between migration, anti-Americanism, and foreign 
policy: (a) the economic exchange mechanism, and (b) the personal con-
tact and information channel. The former refers to the role of economic 
relationships in worsening or improving opinions about the US. Here, 
we have two opposing camps. On one hand, some authors consider that 
the economic activities of the US in the region are an attempt to impose 
its free-market views on Latin American governments by supporting the 
activities of foreign firms, and through its promotion of so-called Wash-
ington Consensus neoliberal policies. For these authors, the economic 
relationship between the US and Latin America generates conflict and 
underdevelopment, and is a source of sovereign-nationalist anti-Ameri-
canism (Rubinstein and Smith 1988; Morris 2005; Sweig 2006). However, 
other authors contend that such portrayal is far from being a fair descrip-
  Remittances and Pro-Americanism in Mexico 9
 

 
tion of how Latin Americans feel with respect to the United States. 
Baker and Cupery (2013: 116) showed that economic integration with 
the United States is not a source of concern, at least for the average Latin 
American citizen. They argued that through enhanced communication 
and cultural exchanges, international trade helps Latin Americans over-
come past resentments and change their perceptions of their northern 
neighbor. Thus, trade appears to reduce anti-American feelings in the 
region considerably. More specifically, an increase in imports from the 
US to Latin America has a sizeable impact in terms of making Latin 
Americans hold a better opinion of the United States.  
The second determinant of anti-Americanism we are interested in 
discussing is the so-called “contact-and-information” hypothesis, where-
by frequent travel, living in the US, or contact with relatives based on the 
other side of the border enhances trust in the US and improves percep-
tions of it (Nye 2004; Morris 2005; Chiozza 2007, 2009; Martínez and 
Lago 2008). It has been shown that relatives of emigrants become stake-
holders with a strong interest in a smooth relationship with the US. A 
side effect of this is that relatives who remain behind have incentives to 
be more informed about what happens in the US, arguably reducing 
prejudice and stereotyping. As one of Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz’s inter-
viewees states in her research,  
I follow international news more – I want to know what is hap-
pening in the north because our son lives there and because our 
life also depends on what is going on outside this country. (Pérez-
Armendáriz 2014: 79) 
The reception of remittances is implicitly mentioned in this quote: one 
factor that makes families more supportive of the US is that the jobs of 
emigrant relatives guarantee a steady flow of income to those who re-
main behind. Consequently, migration, remittances, travel, and contact 
with emigrants is generally considered a good recipe for generating trust 
in the US. 
International migration enters the debates on anti-Americanism 
precisely under the “contact-and-information” and “international eco-
nomic exchange” determinants of anti-Americanism. Azpuru and Boni-
face (2015) used remittances as a proxy for the contact-and-information 
hypothesis. They found that more remittances breed lower distrust of 
the US and concluded: “our research demonstrates that remittances can 
have a positive effect on the image of the United States abroad, more 
specifically in the case of Latin America” (Azpuru and Boniface 2015: 
130). However, of the three measures of economic integration with the 
US examined in Baker and Cupery (2013) (imports and exports, aid, and 
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migration), migration and remittances turn out to have a non-significant 
effect in improving opinions of the US. The authors argued that  
migration scenarios are not always rosy and economically benefi-
cial. Illegality for many Latin American expatriates in the United 
States makes life and work both brutal and precarious. 
Thus, migration has “highly mixed economic consequences,” which 
justifies their non-finding (Baker and Cupery 2013: 119). The results of 
these two empirical studies do not coincide. In a similar vein, Radu 
(2004: 162) asserted that “[anti-Americanism] is a deeply rooted disposi-
tion, also shared by the many illegal or legal immigrants to the United 
States who seek prosperity but not citizenship.”  
None of these recent empirical articles on Latin America explores 
whether anti-American sentiment has any implication beyond learning 
about the determinants of trust and better opinions of the US. Yet, it 
seems logical that research on anti-American sentiment should be fol-
lowed by research on attitudes toward cooperation with the US. Implicit-
ly, the assumption is that better opinions will have positive consequences 
for foreign policymaking by making Latin Americans more willing to 
support greater bilateral collaboration (Morris 2005). However, as we 
show below, this implication does not necessarily follow.3  
In Mexico, anti-Americanism has a long pedigree, being predomi-
nantly of the legacy, sovereign-nationalist, and elitist types. Anti-
Americanism is rooted in several episodes of major US intrusion in Mex-
ican affairs and territory that date back to the nineteenth-century loss of 
half of Mexico’s territory to the US. During the Mexican Revolution, the 
US invaded Veracruz in 1914 and made a new incursion in 1916. During 
the Mexican revolution (1910–1920), Mexicans lived with a feeling of a 
permanent threat. The elites constructed an anti-American discourse by 
portraying an image of the US as intrusive and aggressive (Pastor and 
Castañeda 1988; Martínez and Lago 2008). The hostility was also eco-
nomic and was epitomized in the nationalization of the oil industry in 
1938, followed some decades later by attempts to block US presence in 
strategic sectors such as banking and the oil industry under President 
Echeverría (1970–1976). More recently, however, while elites continue to 
make an instrumental use of this legacy (Baker and Cupery 2013: 110) 
                                                 
3  Chiozza (2009) showed that a generic approval of the US can co-exist with 
disapproval of its diplomacy and foreign policies. We are more specific in this 
paper in that we explore the distinctive attitudes of respondents with migrant 
connections and with regard to an important instance of bilateral cooperation, 
rather than generic perceptions of US foreign policy.  
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and are wary of positioning themselves too close to the US (Martínez 
and Lago 2008), the reality is that Mexico has experienced an extraordi-
nary level of economic integration with the US within the framework of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There is a con-
stant flow of trade, investment, and people across the border that makes 
Mexico an ideal candidate for exploring the ambivalent character of anti-
Americanism, whereby both resentment and admiration, and fear and 
opportunity shape the views that migrants’ families have of the US (Brit-
ton 2006; Martínez and Lago 2008; Délano 2009).  
We illustrate this ambivalence by exploring the impact that migrant 
remittances have on often-used indicators of anti-American sentiment 
versus their impact in shaping views regarding an important concrete 
example of bilateral cooperation: the US campaign on the War on Drugs 
and the fight against drug-related violence on the Mexican side of the 
border.  
2 Sentiment versus Policy Cooperation:  
Migration and Illicit Flows 
Are economic exchanges enough to spur support for closer bilateral 
collaboration? Are the positions of the Mexican and American govern-
ments and migrants’ relatives in line on this particularly thorny policy 
issue? 
The Mexico–US bilateral relationship became strained following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In particular, progress toward 
regularization of the approximately five million immigrants of Mexican 
origin living illegally in the US – a central topic in the agenda of Presi-
dent Vicente Fox (2000–2006) – became stalled after illegal immigration 
took center stage in the fight against terrorism. Instead, the Bush admin-
istration (2001–2009) tightened its immigration policy, increased depor-
tations, devoted more resources to the Border Patrol, and militarized and 
securitized migration by planning to build a 700-mile border wall in an 
attempt to curb the flow of undocumented migrants. Some American 
states, prominently Arizona with its 2010 anti-illegal immigration law 
(SB1070), took radical initiatives that sought to criminalize undocument-
ed presence in the US. Legal and illegal immigration became associated 
with other illegal activities in the political discourse and in policymaking 
(Ashby 2014: 488). Prominently, illegal immigration became associated 
with the illegal flows of drugs, guns, and money, which in turn were used 
to finance the activities of criminal groups and drug cartels on both sides 
of the border.  
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On the Mexican side, starting in 2006, President Felipe Calderón 
launched a frontal attack against drug cartels that set the stage for a dra-
matic surge in drug-related violence and deaths. However, intervention 
by the Mexican government generated greater competition among crimi-
nal gangs, which resulted in a multiplication in the number of criminal 
organizations and their use of violence (Guerrero 2012). More than 
70,000 people had been killed (Shirk and Wallman 2015) and over 22,000 
reported as missing (Merino, Zarkin, and Fierro 2015) by the end of 
Calderón’s administration.  
Other than the unilateral deployment of some 45,000 troops to 
fight cartel violence, several instances of bilateral and less frequently 
multilateral cooperation have been put in place to fight what is seen as 
one of the major threats and challenges for the Mexico–US bilateral 
relationship. After the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North 
America (SPP), which was never implemented, the Mérida Initiative saw 
the United States commit USD 1.4 billion over three years (2008–2010) 
to finance equipment, software, and technical assistance for Mexico’s 
military, police, and judicial forces (Arteaga 2009; Wolf 2011; Carpenter 
2013; Dowling and Inda 2013; Ashby 2014; Seelke and Finklea 2016). 
The Mérida Plan was publicized as a “new paradigm of bilateral coopera-
tion in which national sovereignty is fully respected, guided by mutual 
trust, shared responsibility and reciprocity” (Wolf 2011: 675, our transla-
tion). Despite this and other follow-up instances of collaboration, accu-
sations have been made in both directions. The US has criticized the 
Mexican government for being too lenient on illegal immigration and the 
Mexican government has reproached the American government for not 
tackling what seems to be the root cause of transnational criminal organ-
izations; namely, a steady demand for illicit drugs and guns in the Ameri-
can market (Pastor and Castañeda 1988). For some scholars, bilateral 
cooperation continues to be overly hegemonic and asymmetric, reflect-
ing the economic interests of the US military and capital sectors, which 
see the potential to thrive on the back of the war on drugs (Hussain and 
Schiavon 2013: 12; Mercille 2011: 1645). 
The fight against organized crime is not a concern exclusively of po-
litical elites and policy makers. Drug trafficking and organized crime 
figure prominently among the concerns of the average Mexican. As can 
be seen in Figure 1, according to the survey “Mexico y el Mundo” (see 
below for the survey description), 83 percent of Mexicans surveyed stat-
ed that Mexico should worry a lot about this issue. In contrast, issues 
such as redistribution, the environment, border conflicts, or illegal immi-
gration into Mexico do not cause so much preoccupation among Mexi-
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cans. Moreover, when asked which aspects of the bilateral relationship 
between Mexico and the US are the most important, the war on drugs 
and border security figured in second and third positions, respectively, 
after trade and investment. In view of these data, it makes full sense to 
explore how the fight against cartel violence and related policies shapes 
the sentiments of Mexicans toward the United States.  
Figure 1. Mexicans’ Attitudes toward Organized Crime 
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Moreover, it makes sense not only to explore how this important policy 
issue shapes the sentiments of the average Mexican toward the US, but 
also whether there are significant differences between those with and 
without migratory experience. This is because globalization has a “dark 
side”, and illicit flows of goods and people have emerged to take ad-
vantage of advances in communication and the relaxation of barriers to 
trade and business (Ashby 2014: 484; Andreas 2011). The fact that im-
migration and remittances have occupied center stage in the combat 
against terrorism and drug-related violence is certainly not good news for 
the millions of immigrants and their families, who see their lives as being 
closely scrutinized and their presence in the US observed with suspi-
cion.4 Part of that close scrutiny affects the activities of remitters, since 
large sums of money associated with drug trafficking are thought to be 
laundered using remesadoras (Vlcek 2011, 2013). According to some esti-
mates, 42 percent of exchange offices (casas de cambio) that operate in 
Mexico may be supported by drug trafficking organizations.5  
Some real cases help illustrate the connection between migrant re-
mittances and organized crime. In Spain, internet cafés have been used 
to launder drug money. Gangs sometimes set up these businesses for 
this purpose or resort to existing ones, “compensating” the owner for 
the services. The funds arrive disguised as remittances to relatives of 
immigrants settled in Spain, but end up in the hands of drug cartels. 
When the owner of the internet café is not involved, “the criminals em-
ploy the details of citizens who send legal transfers, mixing them up with 
the illegal ones.” A Dominican couple “Jorge el Terrible” and his wife set 
up “La Real Envíos”, in which they used the details of citizens legally 
sending wire transfers to launder at least 100 million Euros. On other 
occasions, criminals recruit the owners of existing internet cafés to help 
with this process.6 
In Colombia, Mario Aranguren, director of financial information 
and the Analysis Unit, explained that investigations revealed the use of 
false identity documents to send remittances from abroad. Small but 
excessively frequent remittances were arriving at the departments of 
Antioquia, Risaralda, and Valle del Cauca, regions well known for a 
                                                 
4  In particular, informal methods of remittance sending, widely used in some 
countries among certain ethnic groups, have attracted the attention of regula-
tors who fear that these systems may be used to finance terrorist groups. See 
Passas (2003) for a discussion of the well-known hawala transfer system. 
5  See <www.elagora.com.mx/Vinculan-a-centros-cambiarios-con,16976.html> 
(20 June 2017). 
6  See <https://search.proquest.com/docview/885329172?accountid=9630>. 
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strong presence of drug trafficking. According to Aranguren, in only six 
months “some 15,000 people have been reported to Colombian judicial 
authorities for lending their names to receive remittances in exchange for 
commissions.”7 Finally, in El Salvador, new financial regulations have 
been put in place to supervise companies involved in remittance sending 
and to align the El Salvadoran legal system with international regulations 
on the fight against money laundering. And although regulators insist 
that the supervision is put in place to “benefit the clean money obtained 
from the hard work of all our compatriots in the United States” and to 
prevent clean money from mixing with dirty money, a deputy from the 
conservative ARENA Party raised the concern that these regulations and 
enhanced scrutiny may put “receiving remittances into jeopardy.”8 
Regarding Mexico, O’Neil (2009: 75) stated that “illicit profits can 
be hidden in the flow of honestly earned money going back to Mexico, 
complicating efforts against money laundering.” As Hussain and Schia-
von (2013) showed, many of the Mexican companies blacklisted for 
having cartel connections happened to be money exchange centers. As 
those authors put it, “remittances and laundered money intertwine” 
(Hussain and Schiavon 2013: 22), and Hussain added,  
as a migrant lure, remittances breed post-Westphalian cottage in-
dustries (cross-border dynamics explode, family-based mom-and-
pop stores spring [sic], gang membership climbs, drug trafficking 
expands, human smuggling spirals), more in Mexico’s south than 
in the US south. (Hussain 2013: 120) 
Other examples outside Latin America help illustrate the damaging effect 
that the criminalization of migration has on remittance senders’ activities. 
For instance, Horst et al. (2014) explored the connection in the media 
and in policymaking between informal remittances and crime, which has 
affected “migrants’ freedom about their money transfers” (Horst et al. 
2014: 518). In their fieldwork among several migrant communities in 
Norway, Horst et al. perceived “that remittances are a sensitive issue for 
migrants to talk about because of the strong societal focus on their asso-
ciation with illegal activities” (Horst et al. 2014: 517). The same authors 
concluded: 
The public scrutiny of remittances in relation to terrorism and 
crime has an impact on migrants’ daily lives because it affects their 
ability to send remittances. In periods of increased suspicion and 
                                                 
7  See <https://search.proquest.com/docview/460183337?accountid=9630>. 
8  See <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1701691087?accountid=9630>. 
  16 Covadonga Meseguer, Pascal Jaupart, and Javier Aparicio 
 
attention, triggered by events in the country of origin or settle-
ment, it can be difficult or impossible to transfer money. Money 
transfer businesses have had to close down or suspend their oper-
ations temporarily […]. Furthermore, remittance senders are in-
creasingly hesitant to transfer money to certain regions because of 
the suspicion it may arouse. (Horst et al. 2014: 520) 
Framing the combat against terrorism, drug trafficking, and associated 
illicit activities as a “war” does not help build bridges with the migrant 
community and their relatives (Carpenter 2013: 144–145). This type of 
framing invites adversarial rather than collaborative positions and makes 
any further progress in advancing the cause of the Mexican diaspora in 
the US highly unlikely. We hypothesize that given the close scrutiny and 
sometimes overt criminalization of immigrants and remittance flows, 
remittance recipients will be particularly wary of deepening collaboration 
between the Mexican government and the US in the War on Drugs. We 
argue that, among remittance recipients, generic positive opinions and 
trust in the US derived from a closer knowledge of the country and the 
direct experience of the material benefits of this relationship can co-exist 
with a strong rejection of giving a larger role to the US in combating 
criminal activities. This is more likely to be the case if that presence is 
perceived as a threat to the integrity of emigrants or to the resources they 
send back home.  
Thus, from this discussion we seek to test two hypotheses: 
H1: Remittance recipients will hold more positive sentiments toward the 
United States than non-remittance recipients. 
But: 
H2: Remittance recipients will show more apprehension about United 
States involvement in fighting drug violence in Mexico than non-remittance 
recipients.  
3 Data and Methods 
To test our hypotheses, we rely on the 2010 and 2012 waves of the Mexi-
co and the World public opinion survey carried out by the Center for Re-
search and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) (2014) in Mexico City. These 
surveys are based on a nationally representative sample of interviewees 
selected through three-stage stratified random sampling. The 2010 sur-
vey covers 31 Mexican states and 173 municipalities, while the 2012 
wave covers 32 states and 177 municipalities. Each year, 2,400 individu-
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als aged 18 or more were interviewed in person and asked a range of 
questions related to their perceptions of the relationship between Mexico 
and the US and about cooperation with the US in the fight against drug 
trafficking. The survey’s sample size allows analysis of the results at both 
national and regional levels. Interviews were administered “face to face” 
to one resident of each household. The surveys also collected infor-
mation on the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, 
including whether they receive remittances.  
This study considers five dependent variables to assess the effect of 
remittances on opinions toward the US. Table A1 in the Appendix 
shows the survey items and explains the variable recoding. The first two 
variables capture generic opinions toward the US. The first variable we 
consider, Trust, is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the respondent 
said he or she trusted the US, and zero otherwise. Close to 42 percent of 
respondents trust the US in our sample. The second variable, Admire, is 
also binary and is equal to 1 for individuals stating that they admire the 
US. Forty seven percent of interviewees reported that they admire the 
US.9  
Next, we focus on three dependent variables capturing interviewees’ 
opinions about what the relationship between Mexico and the US should 
be with respect to cooperation against drug-related violence. The varia-
ble Money is equal to 1 when respondents say they are in favor of Mexico 
receiving financial assistance from the US to combat drug trafficking. 
More than half of respondents are in favor of such assistance. The next 
variable, Supervision, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if individuals re-
port being in favor of the US supervising the use of these financial re-
sources devoted to combat drug crime in Mexico. A sizeable 70 percent 
share of respondents reported being in favor of US control of the finan-
cial support. The last dependent variable examined is Troops, a binary 
indicator equal to 1 if respondents are in favor of the US sending its 
troops to Mexico to fight drug trafficking. Approximately 60 percent of 
interviewees said they were in favor of US presence.10 All in all, the US 
does not seem to inspire overwhelming trust or admiration among the 
Mexican public. However, a solid majority support its involvement in the 
fight against cartel violence against the expectations of sovereign–nation-
                                                 
9  While the Cronbach alpha is quite high (0.70), we believe that these two varia-
bles capture different dimensions of the perception of the US, as the results be-
low demonstrate.  
10  There is little reason to collapse these three dependent variables, which clearly 
capture different aspects of the bilateral Mexico–US relationship. Their Cron-
bach alpha is low at 0.44. 
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alist concerns. But does this support differ between respondents with migrant con-
nections and those without them? A simple test of equality of means of these 
dependent variables comparing those who receive remittances to those 
who do not suggests that while remittance recipients exhibit more posi-
tive sentiments with respect to the US, they are not, on average, more 
supportive of active US involvement in the fight against drug trafficking 
(see Appendix Table A3).  
Our main independent variable, Remittances, equals 1 for respond-
ents who report receiving remittances. In the sample, 10.4 percent of the 
surveyed adults live in a household that receives financial assistance from 
abroad, but many more report having a relative abroad (about half of the 
2012 wave’s respondents). Thus, a large number of Mexican households 
experience out-migration. Remittances capture one aspect of the material 
benefits of economic integration with the US that should, in principle, be 
positively correlated with more trust and admiration. However, for the 
reasons discussed above, we remain skeptical as to whether out-migra-
tion experience will make these respondents more supportive of closer 
collaboration with the US.  
To control for the possibility that perception of Mexico’s economic 
situation may impact attitudes toward the US, we included an indicator 
capturing the opinions of individuals regarding whether Mexico’s macro-
economic situation over the last 12 months has worsened, stagnated, or 
improved (Sociotropic). According to material theories of anti-American 
sentiment, to the extent that the economic fate of Latin American coun-
tries is seen as inextricably linked to the economic performance of the 
US, some respondents may transfer the responsibility for bad figures to 
the economic policies of the neighbor of the north, thereby affecting 
their assessment of the United States. Mexico is the US’s third-closest 
trading partner and the source of over USD 25 billion in remittances in 
2015 (Ashby 2014; World Bank 2016). Thus, the Mexican economy and 
its communities and households are highly dependent on the state of the 
US economy. Consequently, respondents with a better perception of the 
Mexico’s economic situation are expected to hold more positive views of 
the US.  
We also incorporated an indicator of political ideology measuring 
the self-placement of respondents on a zero-to-10 scale (the variable is 
Ideology, with zero being at the extreme left and 10 at the extreme right). 
Theories of anti-Americanism have clear expectations about where anti-
American feeling is more likely to fall in the ideological spectrum; name-
ly, on the left. There are several reasons for this. First, the US has a long 
legacy of intervening in the region to try to overturn what it regarded as 
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radical leftists, revolutionary, and communist movements and govern-
ments, backing rightist governments and dictators instead (Radu 2004). 
Second, the US is often regarded as embracing neo-liberal economic 
policies that predicate the virtues of a limited role of the state in the 
economy. Those located toward the left of the ideological spectrum and 
supporting a more prominent role for the state in welfare provision and 
wealth redistribution will be less likely to show enthusiasm for US eco-
nomic policies (Morris 2005; Chiozza 2007; Azpuru and Boniface 2015). 
The average value of the Ideology variable across the Mexican sample is 
5.9 (center right).  
We also controlled for several other determinants of attitudes to-
ward the US. We included the respondents’ years of education, age, and age 
squared in order to capture possible non-linearities, a gender indicator 
(male), and a dummy variable measuring whether the respondent is eco-
nomically active. In our sample, 50.6 percent of the individuals are wom-
en and 51.1 percent are working. The average respondent is 41.3 years 
old and has completed 8.9 years of education; that is, up to middle 
school. As a proxy for socio-economic status, we add as a control for 
income a categorical variable reporting whether the individual considers 
her economic situation to be very difficult, difficult, decent, or comfort-
able. Table A2 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for these 
variables.  
4 Results 
4.1 Baseline Models 
For ease of interpretation, we estimate linear probability models to un-
cover the influence of international remittances on attitudes toward the 
US. It should be emphasized that our main results are robust to using a 
logistic regression model and so are our predicted probabilities (see Ta-
ble A4 in the Appendix). Thus, using a linear probability model does not 
affect our results. The general model for explaining our five alternative 
dependent variables – two measures of sentiment and three measures of 
opinions regarding concrete instances of cooperation – takes the follow-
ing form: 
 
Attitudesi,m,t = 0 + 1 Remittancesi,m,t + Xi,m,t 2 + m + t + im (1) 
where Attitudesi,m,t refers to the dependent variables described above for 
individual i living in municipality m and interviewed in year t; Xi,m,t is a 
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vector of control variables; m, t, imt refer to a municipality fixed effect, 
a time effect, and an error term, respectively; and k are the parameters 
to be estimated. Standard errors have been clustered at the municipality 
level to allow for arbitrary correlation of errors within municipalities.11 
As a robustness test, we also estimated our baseline models using coars-
ened exact matching and later using hierarchical linear models to account 
for the inclusion of state-level variables. 
Table 1 shows the results of our five baseline models. The first two 
columns refer to generic sentiments toward the US, while the last three 
ask about concrete issues concerning the bilateral relationship. In line 
with the “material benefits” hypothesis, respondents who receive remit-
tances are approximately 6–10 percentage points (pp) more likely to hold 
positive views about the US than non-remittance recipients. Concretely, 
remittance recipients are more likely to trust and admire the US. Howev-
er, when it comes to endorsing close cooperation with the US in the 
fight against drug trafficking, the gains from remittances are not enough 
to transform these recipients into a support coalition for greater cooper-
ation. Whereas remittance recipients are about 6 pp more likely to sup-
port financial assistance from the US to combat drug trafficking, they are 
approximately 8 pp more opposed to this financial assistance if it entails 
the presence of US troops in Mexican territory. They are also no more 
likely than non-remittance recipients to support the financial aid if it 
entails the supervision of resources by the US.  
The control variables are in line with theoretical expectations in-
spired by other empirical research. Individuals who regard the overall 
economic situation as good are more likely to hold views of trust and 
admiration, but they are not more likely to support collaboration with 
the US if this entails active supervision or US military presence. Those 
respondents who lean toward the right, the economically better-off, and 
male respondents are also more likely to hold positive views of the US. 
Interestingly, additional years of education have a negative and signifi-
cant effect on four out of five models: trusting the US and in several 
scenarios of collaboration with the US regarding the fight against drug 
trafficking. 
                                                 
11  The questions about the supervision of resources and presence of troops were 
asked of the respondents who supported US financial aid. Thus, the last two 
questions are nested within the first one. We ran a Heckman sample selection 
model using as identification several variables correlated with support for US 
aid, but uncorrelated with support for supervision and troops. The test of inde-
pendent equations could not be rejected, suggesting that the nested character of 
the question does not preclude treating these answers as independent.  
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Table 1. Remittances, Pro-American Sentiment, and Cooperation 
 Sentiment Cooperation 
 Trust Admiration Money Supervision Troops 
Remittances  0.0600** 0.0976*** 0.0552** 0.0299 -0.0808** 
 [0.030] [0.028] [0.027] [0.036] [0.037] 
Sociotropic  0.0264*** 0.0147* 0.0262*** 0.00827 -0.00478 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.011] [0.012] 
Education  -0.00614*** -0.00248 -0.00586** -0.00192 -0.0114*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] 
Male  0.0582*** 0.0601*** 0.0447** 0.0511* 0.0344 
 [0.019] [0.022] [0.020] [0.031] [0.035] 
Age  -0.00223 -0.00166 0.00119 0.00200 -0.00641 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
Age squared 0.00002 0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00002 0.00004 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ideology  0.014*** 0.014*** 0.0098*** 0.0091** 0.0034 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
Active  0.00427 -0.000348 -0.00825 0.00207 0.00850 
 [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.033] [0.031] 
Income  0.0339*** 0.0301*** -0.00112 0.0190 0.0341* 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.018] [0.019] 
Municipality 
FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3454 3370 3523 2058 1720 
R2 0.195 0.178 0.192 0.232 0.259 
Note:  OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered on municipality in brack-
ets * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
4.2 Robustness Tests 
The above analysis assumes that the allocation of remittances across 
respondents is random, conditional on our covariates. However, this 
assumption might be false in reality. In particular, both reverse-causation 
and omitted variable bias could affect the validity of our findings. For 
instance, households with positive opinions toward the US in the first 
place might be more likely to encourage one of their members to emi-
grate and only subsequently receive remittances. To address this concern, 
we employed the coarsened exact matching (CEM) method, a nonpara-
metric matching method that reduces the imbalance between treated and 
untreated groups (in our case, remittance-receiving respondents). To 
create a valid control group, the method temporarily coarsens each pre-
treatment covariate into meaningful groups and matches observations on 
these coarsened data. Once matching is achieved, only the original values 
of covariates are retained. Also, CEM automatically restricts the matched 
data to areas of common support among covariates (Iacus, King, and 
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Porro 2012; see Ahmed (2013) for a similar application of the CEM 
matching method).  
We considered five pre-treatment covariates that are likely to pre-
dict the reception of remittances and individual opinions. These are 
gender, the respondent’s age (and its square), the level of education, a 
dummy indicating whether the interviewee speaks an indigenous lan-
guage, and a dummy for residence in a Mexican border state.12 Respond-
ents’ gender, age, and education are typically included as covariates that 
explain the reception of remittances. Speaking an indigenous language 
may be correlated with marginalization from Mexican modern society 
and may therefore affect remittance receipt and attitudes toward the US. 
Living in one of Mexico’s northern border states may influence opinions 
regarding various elements of the relationship with the US and also af-
fect the likelihood of receiving remittances. These variables are unlikely 
to be determined by receiving remittances.13 After matching the data, we 
ran the same linear probability models to uncover the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT), namely of remittances, on our five depend-
ent variables.  
Coefficient estimates of CEM regression models for US sentiment 
variables are presented in Table 2 and plotted in Figures 2 and 3. Ac-
counting for the possible non-random character of remittances, our main 
results are somewhat stronger and substantively the same in sign as those 
from Table 1. In line with the material gains hypothesis, individuals who 
receive remittances are more likely to have positive perceptions of the 
US (between 10 and 11 pp more); as before, however, these individuals 
are not more likely to support greater cooperation with the US if this 
cooperation entails a greater scrutiny of resources. Moreover, remittance 
recipients are clearly opposed to receiving financial support if this entails 
greater US military presence in Mexico (about 9 pp less supportive). As 
before, men who self-identify with the right and have positive percep-
tions of Mexico’s economic situation are the ones who are most likely to 
                                                 
12  The border states are Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo 
León, and Tamaulipas.  
13  The inclusion of education in the selection equation could be seen as problem-
atic given that remittances have been proven to have an impact on incentives to 
acquire education; that is, remittances can impact educational outcomes. In 
Mexico, the evidence is mixed (Sawyer 2016). In any case, removing education 
from the selection equation does not alter our results. Also, the main weakness 
of CEM is that it assumes that the treatment assignment is ignorable condition-
al on covariates. In other words, it assumes the absence of any unmeasured 
confounders. 
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have positive views of the US, but more educated respondents are less 
likely to exhibit positive views of the US.  
Table 2.  Remittances, Pro-American Sentiment and Cooperation Coars-
ened Exact Matching (CEM) Models 
 Sentiment Cooperation 
 Trust Admiration Money Supervision Troops 
Remittances 0.101*** 0.113*** 0.0560* 0.00568 -0.0913* 
 [0.033] [0.032] [0.030] [0.039] [0.047] 
Sociotropic 0.0328*** 0.0215* 0.0325*** -0.00655 0.00527 
 [0.012] [0.013] [0.011] [0.016] [0.016] 
Education -0.00844* -0.00694* -0.00690 -0.00147 -0.00962 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] 
Male 0.0489* 0.0639* 0.0857*** 0.0811* 0.0625 
 [0.026] [0.034] [0.028] [0.043] [0.054] 
Age 0.00838* -0.0000252 -0.00108 0.00508 0.000865 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008] 
Age^2 -0.0001** -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00007 -0.00005 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ideology 0.0173*** 0.0134*** 0.0142** 0.000271 0.000758 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Active 0.0124 0.0244 -0.00832 -0.0384 -0.0194 
 [0.031] [0.029] [0.029] [0.042] [0.049] 
Income 0.0402** 0.0383** -0.00211 0.0116 0.0370 
 [0.018] [0.018] [0.016] [0.020] [0.026] 
Municipal 
Fes Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2485 2435 2531 1497 1256 
R2 0.251 0.243 0.260 0.309 0.346 
Note:  Robust standard errors clustered on municipality in brackets * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
In the theory section, we explained that emigration and financial remit-
tances associated with it represent a different kind of material gains than 
those from trade because they are affected by anti-drug-trafficking poli-
cies in a potentially direct way. If our claim is correct, other forms of 
economic interaction should not spur the same degree of opposition to 
collaboration with the US in the fight against drug violence. To verify 
this, we ran a series of models controlling for the respondents’ opinions 
about the benefits that international trade has made to their lives. We 
chose this variable considering that international trade and imports from 
the US in particular have been shown to boost pro-American sentiment 
(Baker and Cupery 2013). Thus, this issue provides a good point of 
comparison.  
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Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Covariates on Sentiments toward the US, 
CEM Estimates (90 percent confidence intervals) 
 
Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Covariates on Cooperation with the US, CEM 
Estimates (90 percent confidence intervals) 
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While individuals who receive remittances may see the inflow of money 
threatened by increased supervision and scrutiny, and may therefore be 
more hostile to cooperation with the US in cracking down on drug-
related crime, respondents’ support for free trade should be positively 
related or unrelated to opinions on collaboration with the US in the war 
on drugs. Approximately 64 percent of respondents in our sample stated 
that free trade is beneficial for them.  
We also controlled for a couple of geographic variables that may 
mediate the relationship between remittances and attitudes toward the 
US. First, we included an indicator of whether the recipient is located in 
a border state. Residence in a border state is likely to exacerbate the 
perception of both the advantages and the disadvantages of nearness to 
the US. Second, unfortunately, the survey did not include questions 
about individual levels of crime victimization. Instead, we included an 
indicator of state levels of cartel violence as measured by a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the respondent lives in a state that is a territory 
disputed by at least two criminal organizations (Phillips 2015).14 Border 
states are disputed territories, but many other Mexican states are also 
subject to cartel violence.15 For instance, in 2012, 15 non-border states 
were disputed territories, and some of them (for instance, Guanajuato, 
Michoacán, and Guerrero) are also high emigration intensity states. Since 
we controlled for state level variables, we ran multilevel models that 
account for the hierarchical nature of the data (individuals nested in 
states).  
Table 3 summarizes the results of the hierarchical models. Belief 
that trade with the US increases respondents’ living standards is strongly 
correlated with trusting and admiring the US. After we controlled for 
attitudes toward trade, which clearly boost pro-American sentiment, the 
reception of remittances is only associated with feelings of admiration 
for the northern neighbor. Thus, in line with Baker and Cupery (2013), 
we find that perceptions about the benefits of trade do have more lever-
age in shaping pro-American sentiment than the reception of remittanc-
es. Positive opinions regarding trade are strongly correlated with sup-
porting US financial aid, even with support for supervision of these 
resources. However, believing that trade is beneficial is not enough to 
make these respondents more supportive of the presence of US troops 
to fight cartel violence.  
                                                 
14  See also his documentation at <https://sites.google.com/site/brianjphillips/ 
research> (21 June 2017). 
15  The correlation between border states and disputed territories is positive, but 
low (0.12). 
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Residence in a border state increases trust and admiration for the 
US and makes residents more supportive of the presence of troops. 
However, residence in a disputed territory has the opposite effect, sub-
stantively decreasing support for US military involvement by 14 pp. In 
the Appendix Table A5, we control for whether the respondent is based 
in a border state, and interact remittances with border state and disputed 
territory. These interactions are not statistically significant. After control-
ling for individual attitudes toward trade and for state levels of violence, 
remittance recipients continue to be about 8 pp less likely than non-
remittance recipients to support the presence of troops in exchange of 
financial support to crack down on cartel activity.  
Table 3. Remittances, Trade and Geography. HLM Models 
 Sentiment Cooperation 
 Trust Admiration Money Supervision Troops 
Remittances 0.00634 0.0760** 0.0615* 0.0454 -0.0756* 
 [0.032] [0.033] [0.032] [0.039] [0.043] 
Trade is 
Beneficial 
0.0811*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.0581** 0.00927 
 [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.027] [0.032] 
Disputed 
Territory 
-0.0437 -0.0417 -0.0809* 0.0801 -0.143*** 
 [0.039] [0.040] [0.042] [0.052] [0.054] 
Border State 0.136*** 0.0679* 0.0168 0.0113 0.0963** 
 [0.038] [0.035] [0.048] [0.046] [0.042] 
Sociotropic 0.0205** 0.0161* 0.0296*** 0.0221** -0.00302 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.011] [0.012] 
Education -0.00713*** -0.00257 -0.00625** 0.00273 -0.0104*** 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] 
Male 0.0574*** 0.0660*** 0.0478** 0.0480* 0.0405 
 [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.029] [0.033] 
Age -0.000374 0.000573 0.00324 0.00155 -0.00373 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
Age^2 -0.000002 -0.00001 -0.00006* -0.00002 0.00001 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ideology 0.0134*** 0.0121*** 0.00458 0.00832* 0.00499 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
Active 0.00270 -0.00496 -0.0266 0.00773 -0.0172 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.029] [0.034] 
Income 0.0345*** 0.0343*** -0.00151 0.0209 0.0193 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.016] [0.019] 
Standard 
Deviation 
(sigma-u) 
0.476 0.485 0.478 0.472 0.485 
First Level N 2468 2410 2509 1492 1182 
Second Level 
N 32 32 32 32 32 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Note:  Standard errors in brackets * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
  Remittances and Pro-Americanism in Mexico 27
 

 
The presence of US troops in the country is a clear red line to cooperation 
among remittance recipients, even after controlling for their views on 
trade, disputed territories, or border states.  
To assess whether our results vary across gender, we ran separate 
regressions for men and women based on the linear probability model in 
Table 1; results can be found in Appendix Table A6. Overall, our find-
ings are not greatly affected when heterogeneous gender effects are esti-
mated. The impact of remittances on all outcomes tends to be of the 
same sign and order of magnitude. However, we did lose some degree of 
statistical significance. This is mainly due to the smaller samples we work 
with when we split our dataset along the gender dimension. On the 
whole, our findings are not compromised by this robustness check. 
Finally, while this research focuses on financial remittances, Table 4 
explores the role of social remittances – the “ideas, behaviors, identities, 
and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communi-
ties” (Levitt 1998: 927) – by looking at the impact that contact with rela-
tives abroad has in shaping sentiment and views about collaboration with 
the United States. The ordinal variable “Contact with Relatives” captures 
whether the respondent has no relatives, or has relatives but no contact 
with them, and how frequently contact happens (rarely, sometimes, fre-
quently, and daily contact). The question about contact was asked in the 
2012 wave only. That year, about half of Mexicans surveyed reported 
having relatives abroad and about 30 percent reported being in touch 
with them sometimes, frequently, or daily.  
Interestingly, research on social remittances has shown that com-
munication with relatives has a positive influence on political attitudes 
(Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz 2014) and politi-
cal behaviors (Córdova and Hiskey 2015) as diverse as identifying with 
political parties, persuading others in political conversations, participat-
ing in local politics, protesting, and other forms of non-electoral political 
participation. In her research on trans-border communication between 
Mexicans and their émigré relatives, Pérez Armendáriz (2014) showed 
that views about democratic institutions, respect for the rule of law, and 
individual human rights are conveyed through trans-border conversa-
tions, shaping the behaviors of those back home.  
The distinctiveness of the migratory phenomenon is again made ev-
ident in these results: Trans-border conversations hardly shape in any 
meaningful way either sentiment or views on collaboration with the 
United States in combating drug trafficking. The coefficient for contact 
with relatives is statistically significant in only two out of five models, 
and the predicted probabilities for each of the categories of contact are 
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not significantly different from each other. This suggests that the flow of 
information arriving from the other side of the border does not portray 
the involvement of the US in fighting cartel violence in Mexico as posi-
tive or desirable.  
Table 4.  Social Remittances, Pro-Americanism and Cooperation 
 Sentiment Cooperation 
 Trust Admiration Money Supervision Troops 
Contact with 
Relatives 
0.0112 0.0144* 0.0189** 0.00364 -0.00664 
 [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.012] 
Sociotropic 0.0208 0.0130 0.0234* 0.00556 -0.00123 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.018] [0.018] 
Education -0.00632* -0.00257 -0.00890*** -0.00707 -0.0149** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006] 
Male 0.0599** 0.0626** 0.0126 0.0157 0.0745 
 [0.027] [0.031] [0.026] [0.041] [0.046] 
Age 0.00141 -0.00106 -0.00027 0.00740 0.00144 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] 
Age^2 -0.00001 0.000002 -0.00002 -0.000081 -0.00004 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ideology 0.0102** 0.0133*** 0.0106** 0.00731 -0.0000203 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] 
Active -0.00912 -0.00399 0.0124 0.0316 0.0144 
 [0.035] [0.032] [0.030] [0.048] [0.045] 
Income 0.0168 0.0188 0.00445 0.0362* 0.0295 
 [0.017] [0.016] [0.018] [0.022] [0.027] 
Municipal Fes Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1706 1674 1758 936 932 
R2 0.220 0.223 0.232 0.331 0.294 
Note:  Robust standard errors clustered on municipality in brackets * p<0.1 ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
Indirectly, we verify that the information arriving from emigrants regard-
ing collaboration with the US is not particularly positive by looking at a 
few items in the Survey of Latinos, June 2006 (Pew Hispanic Center) con-
cerning border protection.16 This survey contains a couple of questions 
about support or opposition to two border control measures: increasing 
the number of border patrol agents and sending National Guard troops 
to the border. Opposition to both policies is high among Latinos, and 
even higher among the 513 Mexicans (the largest Latino group) included 
in the sample. While 52 percent oppose increasing the number of border 
patrol agents, 73 percent oppose sending National Guard troops to pro-
tect the border. When the same questions are answered by Latinos born 
in Mexico, the response rates rise to 72 percent, and a very high 89 per-
                                                 
16  See <www.people-press.org/2011/01/20/economy-dominates-publics-agenda-
dims-hopes-for-the-future/> (21 June 2017). 
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cent, respectively. Interestingly, there are statistically significant differ-
ences between those respondents with and without contact with relatives 
back in Mexico: those with contact with their families south of the bor-
der are significantly more opposed to increasing the number of border 
patrol agents. Among the whole Latino sample, opposition to more 
border patrol agents and to sending national guard troops is significantly 
greater among those who send financial remittances and who have con-
tact with their relatives than among Latinos without those linkages.17 
Therefore, despite the monetary and social connections with their emi-
grant relatives, it is not surprising pro-American feelings receive so little 
support among Mexicans left behind, in contrast with the prediction of 
the “contact-and-information hypothesis”.  
All in all, pro-American sentiment, more in the form of admiration 
than of trust, co-exists with anti-American feelings among families left 
behind. We attribute this mismatch to the linkage between the war on 
drugs, the criminalization of migration, and a closer scrutiny of financial 
transactions associated with migration and remittances.  
5 Conclusion 
This paper has explored whether the material benefits of migration – 
namely, financial remittances – make Mexicans more pro-American. In 
line with previous research, we hypothesized that material benefits de-
rived from collaboration with the US positively shape views about this 
country. However, we considered it necessary to add some nuance to the 
issue, along two lines. First, most discussions about anti- and pro-
Americanism, and certainly the scant empirical research that exists on the 
topic, have looked at sentiments of trust and admiration or overall opin-
ions about the US. But can we infer attitudes toward concrete instances 
of cooperation from generic views about the country?  
Second, are all material gains the same? So far, empirical research 
tells us that greater trade integration and access to imports translate into 
more positive opinions about the US. Other scholars have used remit-
tances as a proxy for contact and knowledge of the destination country, 
reporting a positive relationship between remittances and sentiments 
toward the US.  
                                                 
17  In the entire Latino (Mexican-born) sample, about 47 percent (52 percent) send 
remittances and 72 percent (71 percent) are in touch with their families one or 
two times a month, once a week, or more than once a week.  
  30 Covadonga Meseguer, Pascal Jaupart, and Javier Aparicio 
 
Our research shows, first, that stronger positive feelings toward the 
US do not necessarily translate into greater support for collaboration. 
Second, it shows that the material benefits of international migration are 
complex and multifaceted. We studied the attitudes of Mexican respond-
ents with respect to greater collaboration with the US in the War on 
Drugs, and found that remittance recipients were particularly reluctant to 
support US military involvement. We interpret this finding on the basis 
of a perverse connection in the political and policy discourse between 
drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and money laundering. The connec-
tion has criminalized migration flows and has put remittances, remitters, 
and the remittance-sending sector at the center of the debate.  
This research has clear theoretical and policy implications. Criminal-
izing migration has made migrants and their relatives back home wary of 
collaboration with the US in the fight against drug trafficking. As much 
as remittance recipients seem to admire (rather than trust) the US more 
than non-recipients, they are not particularly supportive of US presence 
in the country. Receiving remittances shapes opinions about collabora-
tion in a different way than opinions about trade integration do, reveal-
ing the distinctive character of the “material benefits” argument when 
applied to international migration and the limits of “material benefits” 
theory in making individuals more pro-American.  
Successful bilateral collaboration in the war against drugs will very 
likely demand the cooperation of migrants, their families, migrant organ-
izations, and the remittance sector. Therefore, we believe that the US 
should water down its criminalization discourse around migration, while 
the Mexican government should reassure migrants and remittance recipi-
ents that fighting cartel violence will not threaten the honest flow of 
remittances to families left behind.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Survey Items and Recodifications 
Trust  How would you describe your feelings towards the United 
States of America? Trust (1), Distrust (0), Indifferent (0). 
Admiration How would you describe your feelings towards the United 
States of America? Admiration (1), Contempt (0), Indif-
ferent (0). 
Money Are you in favor or against Mexico receiving financial help 
from the US to combat drug trafficking? In favor (1), 
Against (0), It depends (0). 
Supervision And, what if the US demands to supervise the use of 
these financial resources? In favor (1), Against (0), It 
depends (0). 
Troops And, what if the US demands to send agents meant to be 
operating on Mexican soil? In favor (1), Against (0), It 
depends (0). 
Sociotropic With respect to the same month a year ago, would you say 
that the economic situation of the country is now Better 
(4), As good as last year (3), As bad as last year (2), Worse 
(1)? 
Remittances Do you or one of your family members receive money 
from relatives working outside the country? Yes (1), No 
(0). 
Contact with 
relatives 
How frequently are you in contact with relatives living 
abroad? No relative abroad (0), Never (1), Rarely (2), 
Sometimes (3), Frequently (4), Every day (5). 
Political Ideolo-
gy 
Talking about your political orientation, where do you 
stand on a 0 to 10 scale? Left (0), Right (10). 
Income  Considering total household income, would you say that 
your economic situation is Very difficult (1), Difficult (2), 
Decent (3), or Comfortable (4)? 
Border state Mexican border state dummy. Equals (1) for Baja Califor-
nia, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, Tamauli-
pas. And (0) otherwise. 
Trade is benefi-
cial 
Is free trade good or bad for your living conditions? Good 
(1), Bad (0), It depends (0). 
Disputed territo-
ry 
A Mexican state is coded as “disputed territory (1)” if 
cartels are fighting over it that year and (0) otherwise.++ 
Demographic 
control variables 
Years of education, Age, Age squared, Gender dummy 
(male=1), Individual economic active dummy (active=1).  
Source:  CIDE Mexico and the World - 2010 and 2012 waves (unless otherwise speci-
fied). ++ Source: Phillips 2015. 
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Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Observa-
tions 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min-
imum
Maxi-
mum 
Trust 4,587 0.418 0.493 0 1 
Admiration 4,453 0.474 0.499 0 1 
Money 4,428 0.553 0.497 0 1 
Supervision 2,425 0.704 0.457 0 1 
Troops 1,974 0.603 0.489 0 1 
Remittances  4,800 0.104 0.306 0 1 
Contact 2,400 1.435 1.644 0 5 
Dependence 4,800 0.132 0.467 0 3 
Sociotropic 4,695 2.157 1.175 1 4 
Education  4,788 8.868 4.490 0 20 
Male  4,800 0.494 0.500 0 1 
Age  4,795 41.297 15.810 18 99 
Age squared 4,795 1,955.348 1,459.752 324 9,801 
Ideology 3,713 5.931 2.825 0 10 
Active 4,788 0.511 0.499 0 1 
Income 4,735 2.214 1.111 0 4 
 
Table A.3. Attitudes and Opinions by Remittance Status 
 Receives remittances   
 No Yes   
 Mean Mean t-stat p-value 
Trust 0.422 0.511 -2.532 0.011 
Admiration 0.467 0.560 -2.609 0.009 
Money 0.478 0.493 -0.429 0.668 
Supervision  0.669 0.746 -1.731 0.084 
Troops 0.473 0.450 0.478 0.633 
Source:  México and the World survey - 2010 and 2012 waves. 
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Table A.4. Logit Estimates of Table 1 
 Sentiment Cooperation 
 Trust Admiration Money Supervision Troops 
Remittances  0.286** 0.477*** 0.272** 0.177 -0.431** 
 [0.143] [0.134] [0.127] [0.191] [0.182] 
Sociotropic  0.132*** 0.0712* 0.128*** 0.0420 -0.0274 
 [0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.057] [0.057] 
Education  -0.0319*** -0.0120 -0.0283** -0.0105 -0.0597*** 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.016] [0.019] 
Male  0.294*** 0.286*** 0.217** 0.276* 0.189 
 [0.094] [0.101] [0.092] [0.154] [0.167] 
Age  -0.0119 -0.00855 0.00612 0.0106 -0.0339 
 [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.019] [0.021] 
Age squared 0.00010 0.000075 -0.00017 -0.00014 0.00025 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ideology  0.0739*** 0.0682*** 0.0476*** 0.0505** 0.0178 
 [0.017] [0.016] [0.015] [0.023] [0.025] 
Active  0.0260 0.00568 -0.0341 0.00916 0.0435 
 [0.108] [0.091] [0.096] [0.168] [0.151] 
Income  0.169*** 0.145*** -0.00339 0.102 0.177** 
 [0.053] [0.053] [0.059] [0.089] [0.086] 
Diff. in ppa 0.079 0.118 0.0699 0.0403 -0.107 
Municipal 
FEs Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FEs Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3308 3227 3429 1794 1520 
Note:  Robust standard errors clustered on municipality in brackets * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. a Remittance effect, holding covariates at mean values. 
Table A.5. Interaction Effects 
 Cooperation 
 Money Supervision Troops 
Remittances  0.0607 0.0279 -0.116** 
 [0.039] [0.048] [0.055] 
Border state 0.00577 0.0144 0.0674 
 [0.048] [0.046] [0.050] 
Remittances*Border State -0.00151 0.0547 0.0981 
 [0.068] [0.082] [0.090] 
Disputed territory     
    
Remittances*Disputed territory    
    
Trade Living Standards 0.108*** 0.0559** 0.0111 
 [0.021] [0.027] [0.032] 
Sociotropic  0.0297*** 0.0220** -0.00471 
 [0.008] [0.011] [0.012] 
Education  -0.0061** 0.0025 -0.0097*** 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] 
Male  0.0480** 0.0486* 0.0352 
 [0.022] [0.029] [0.033] 
Age  0.00310 0.00170 -0.00412 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
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 Cooperation 
 Money Supervision Troops 
Age squared  -0.00006* -0.00002 0.00001 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ideology  0.00445 0.00860* 0.00514 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
Active  -0.0256 0.00581 -0.0112 
 [0.023] [0.029] [0.034] 
Income  -0.00153 0.0205 0.0194 
 [0.013] [0.016] [0.019] 
Panel Level Variance (lnsig2u) -2.413*** -2.606*** -2.534*** 
 [0.206] [0.252] [0.278] 
Standard Deviation (sigma-u) 0.478 0.472 0.485 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Observations 2509 1492 1182 
 
 Cooperation 
 Money Supervision Troops 
Remittances  -0.0596 0.114 -0.150 
 [0.121] [0.144] [0.149] 
Border state    
    
Remittances*Border State    
    
Disputed territory  -0.0883** 0.0882* -0.122** 
 [0.042] [0.053] [0.057] 
Remittances*Disputed territory 0.130 -0.0738 0.0805 
 [0.126] [0.150] [0.155] 
Trade Living Standards 0.107*** 0.0582** 0.00973 
 [0.021] [0.027] [0.032] 
Sociotropic  0.0297*** 0.0226** -0.00140 
 [0.008] [0.011] [0.012] 
Education  -0.0062** 0.0027 -0.0099*** 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] 
Male  0.0481** 0.0479* 0.0374 
 [0.022] [0.029] [0.033] 
Age  0.00339 0.00152 -0.00348 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
Age squared  -0.00006* -0.00002 0.00001 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ideology  0.00464 0.00826* 0.00492 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] 
Active  -0.0266 0.00747 -0.0158 
 [0.023] [0.029] [0.034] 
Income  -0.00168 0.0212 0.0186 
 [0.013] [0.016] [0.019] 
Panel Level Variance (lnsig2u) -2.408*** -2.561*** -2.594*** 
 [0.199] [0.245] [0.289] 
Standard Deviation (sigma-u) 0.478 0.472 0.485 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Observations 2509 1492 1182 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on municipality in brackets * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A.6. Gender Effects, Remittances and Pro-Americanism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Female   
 Trust Admiration Money Supervision Troops 
Remittances 0.0816* 0.104** 0.0838** -0.0502 -0.105* 
 [0.047] [0.046] [0.042] [0.063] [0.064] 
Sociotropic 0.0202 0.0228 0.0312** -0.00232 -0.00965 
 [0.013] [0.014] [0.012] [0.019] [0.019] 
Education -0.00356 0.000858 -0.00619 -0.000338 -0.0103 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] 
Age -0.00202 -0.00376 0.00604 -0.000798 -0.0147** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] 
Age^2 0.0000194 0.0000409 -0.0000829 -0.00000183 0.000131* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ideology 0.0101* 0.0175*** 0.00418 0.00411 0.00792 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] 
Active 0.000186 -0.0247 -0.00410 -0.0148 -0.0448 
 [0.034] [0.028] [0.030] [0.056] [0.055] 
Income 0.0394** 0.0262 -0.00570 0.0284 0.0575* 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.021] [0.026] [0.034] 
      
Muni. FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1640 1598 1678 955 782 
R2 0.279 0.271 0.257 0.386 0.413 
 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
   Male   
 Trust Admiration Money Supervision Troops 
Remittances 0.0308 0.0947** 0.0246 0.0889* -0.0700 
 [0.039] [0.046] [0.039] [0.054] [0.060] 
Sociotropic 0.0376*** 0.00958 0.0205* 0.0178 0.00758 
 [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.018] [0.018] 
Education -0.00609** -0.00254 -0.00355 -0.00519 -0.0148*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] 
Age -0.00216 -0.00360 -0.00497 0.00258 -0.00147 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] 
Age^2 0.0000187 0.0000295 0.0000308 -0.0000478 -0.00000797 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ideology 0.0159*** 0.0106** 0.0132*** 0.0154** 0.00933 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008] 
Active 0.0154 0.0396 -0.00506 0.00436 0.0296 
 [0.035] [0.035] [0.033] [0.047] [0.053] 
Income 0.0263* 0.0240 0.00284 0.00478 0.0240 
 [0.016] [0.018] [0.018] [0.026] [0.028] 
      
Muni. FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1814 1772 1845 1103 938 
R2 0.249 0.240 0.252 0.300 0.346 
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Los Límites de los beneficios materiales: Remesas y Pro-Ameri-
canismo en México 
Resumen: En este artículo estudiamos cómo la recepción de remesas 
afecta las percepciones de la relación bilateral entre México y los Estados 
Unidos. Diversos autores afirman que los beneficios económicos de la 
relación con los Estados Unidos prevalecen sobre preocupaciones impe-
rialistas, que resultan de la asimetría de poder entre los dos países. La 
investigación empírica muestra que la opinión pública latinoamericana 
valora con más entusiasmo a los Estados Unidos de lo que muchas teo-
rías predicen. Identificamos dos temas poco explorados en esta literatura. 
Primero, los estudiosos del anti-americanismo se han centrado en enten-
der sentimientos genéricos hacia los Estados Unidos, pasando por alto 
ejemplos más concretos de cooperación entre los dos países. Segundo, la 
mayoría de los autores se han focalizado en el comercio y en las inver-
siones ignorando de forma sistemática cómo los beneficios asociados a la 
emigración pueden moldear las actitudes hacia los Estados Unidos. 
Nuestro trabajo llena estos dos vacíos usando nuevos datos de opinión 
pública. Por un lado, encontramos que la recepción de remesas se corre-
laciona positivamente con sentimientos positivos hacia los Estados Uni-
dos. Por otro lado, encontramos que los receptores de remesas se opo-
nen a una mayor cooperación con los Estados Unidos en la lucha contra 
el tráfico de drogas. Nuestro argumento es que este resultado contradic-
torio tiene que ver con la naturaleza específica del fenómeno migratorio 
y con la conexión entre las políticas antidrogas y el escrutinio de los 
flujos ilegales de personas y de dinero.  
Palabras clave: México, pro-Americanismo, emigración, remesas, rela-
ciones México-Estados Unidos, guerra contra las drogas, crimen, política 
exterior 
 
